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Abstract
A cryptographic protocol is a distributed program that can be executed by several
actors. Since several runs of the protocol within the same execution are allowed,
models of cryptoprotocols are often innite. Sometimes, for verication purposes,
only a nite and approximated model is needed. For this, we consider the problem
of computing such an approximation and we propose to simulate the required partial
execution in an abstract level. More precisely, we dene an abstract nite category
G
a
as an abstract game semantics for the SPC calculus, a dedicated calculus for
security protocols. The abstract semantics is then used to build a decision procedure
for secrecy correctness in security protocols.
1 Motivations and Background
With the dazzling expansion of computer networks and the emergence of new
technologies such as World Wide Web and electronic commerce, security be-
came a major concern for the computer research community. Accordingly,
a surge of interest is devoted to the design, implementation and analysis of
security protocols.
During the last decade, plenty of cryptographic protocols have been devised.
Many among them have been shown awed many years after their use. Con-
sequently, a great deal of interest has been expressed into the development
of formal techniques for the specication, design and verication of crypto-
protocols. Furthermore, we anticipate that the rapid expansion of distributed
systems, communication networks, Internet, web applications, etc., will cer-
tainly bring a major need in security protocols. It is then imperative to have
appropriate environments for the correct development of these protocols.
c
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The main intent of this paper is to characterize the verication of security
protocols as an abstract interpretation of a game semantics that is ascribed
to SPC, a dedicated calculus for security protocols. The abstract semantics is
dened by the means of a nite abstract category where objects represent roles
behaviors, morphisms represent intruder strategies and morphism composition
captures interactions between intruder strategies. The new abstract semantics
is used to approximate the space of intruder knowledge to a nite one when it
instruments a cryptoprotocol. This information is then used to decide if the
cryptoprotocol satises the secrecy property on a sensitive message.
Here is the way the rest of this paper is organized. Section 2 is devoted to the
state of the art in terms of languages and calculi for cryptoprotocol description
and formal verication of cryptoprotocols. Section 3 presents an algebraic
formalization of the message space. Section 4 presents the SPC calculus and
its game semantics. Section 5 is dedicated to the abstract game semantic of
SPC. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
The specication and analysis of security protocols is now identied as an
urgent and critical issue for the computer security community. During the
past years, a surge of interest has been devoted to the elaboration of calculi,
languages and logics for the development and the analysis of security protocols.
Very frequently, the standard notation has been used as a language for the
description of cryptoprotocols. The notation is concise and elegant. Neverthe-
less, it rests on syntactic conventions and implicit aspects that make hard any
formal handling and systematic/automatic analysis. We believe that there is a
desideratum that consists in endowing such a syntax with a formal semantics.
Several logics have been invented for the specication of cryptoprotocols. The
most prominent logic is BAN, advanced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in
[12,13,14]. BAN is a belief logic dedicated to authentication protocols. It is
meant to allow a high-level reasoning on the functional properties of crypto-
graphic protocols. After the pioneering work on BAN, plenty of derived logics
have been advanced [3,17,21,22,30]. In 1990, Bieber [7] developed CKT5, a
modal logic of knowledge, which has been revised and extended by Carlsen
in [15] and Snekkenes in [37]. Concurrently, many other logics attempted to
combine several aspects of modal logic such as belief, knowledge and trust
[20,33,34,38]. In [6], a new linear and modal logic for specifying security pro-
tocols has been advanced by Adi, Debbabi and Mejri. The logic is compact,
expressive and formal and has been used to specify classical security proto-
cols and electronic commerce protocols. These methods have been successfully
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used to detect many aws in cryptographic protocols and they are very expres-
sive in specifying security properties. Nevertheless, they are not very suitable
to specify the protocols themselves. In fact, the protocols are often translated
into a set of logical formulas. The translation process, often referred to as ide-
alization, is error prone since it aims to translate an operational description
into a logical one. Furthermore, the idealization is not systematic. Moreover,
most of the proposed logics while proven sound with respect to some seman-
tics are generally incomplete. In addition, the verication of the protocol is
always manual and semi-formal.
Model oriented languages allow the specication of system properties by de-
scribing a model or a class of models, which represent the main aspects of
its behavior. Some of these languages have been used for the specication of
security protocols. As an example, we mention the use of VDM [7,8,9], Z [11]
and B [8]. These languages are now rmly established and known to be of
great use in specication and verication. Nevertheless, they are not dedi-
cated to cryptographic protocols. They fail to capture in a natural way all the
behavioral and computational requirements for security protocols. Moreover,
they need much of expert assistance during the verication process. Actually,
they rely on manual or interactive theorem proving techniques.
Process algebra is known to be an elegant and concise framework that caters
for specications that are very close to the operational intuitions. In 1995,
Gavin Lowe [26,27,28,29] successfully used CSP [23] for the specication and
verication of many cryptoprotocols. Protocols are specied as sets of com-
municating sequential processes that are running in parallel and interacting
with their environments. The verication is performed by model-checking
techniques. A similar approach was developed by Bill Roscoe, Paul Gardiner,
Dave Jackson and Janson Hulance in [18,19,35] and Steve Schneider in [36]. In
the same vein, Lotos was used for cryptoprotocol specication and analysis by
Boyd in [10] and Varadharajan in [39,40,41]. John C. Mitchell, Marc Mitchell
and Ulrich Stern used murphi in [32] for the verication of cryptoprotocols.
A similar approach was developed by Wilfredo Marrero, Edmund M. Clarke
and Somesh Jha in [16].
The most prominent specication language for security protocols is the SPI
calculus [1,2]. It is built on top of the -calculus of Milner [31], a process
algebra with mobile communication ports. The SPI calculus models protocols
as a set of processes running in parallel. The calculus is endowed with an
operational semantics for which a testing behavioral equivalence is dened.
The nicest feature of SPI is the use of this equivalence to capture message au-
thentication. However, it remains that the SPI calculus is not that exclusively
dedicated to security protocols since it is built on top of the -calculus. Ac-
cordingly, it inherits constructs that are not relevant to security protocols. As
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an example, we may cite communication ports or channels used in SPI spec-
ications that aects the readability of the descriptions and makes tedious
practical proof development.
3 Message Algebra
In this section, we present an algebraic formalization of the message space used
by SPC specications. This formalization comes as a many-sorted ordered
algebra. We call message algebra the term algebra T


(X) associated with the
signature  = ((S;
S
);
) where:
S = fNat;Msg;Agt; Srv; Int;Nce;Key; Cteg

 =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
0 : ! Nat
succ : Nat ! Nat
+ : NatNat ! Nat
cte : ! Cte
S : ! Srv
I : Agt ! Int
A;B : Nat ! Agt
 : Nat Agt ! Nat
N : Nat Agt ! Nce
K : Agt ! Key
K
 1
: Agt ! Key
K : Agt AgtNat ! Key
K : Agt Agt ! Key
f g : Msg Key ! Msg
; : Msg Msg ! Msg
The sorts Nat; Msg; Agt; Srv; Int; Nce; Key and Cte are used respec-
tively for natural numbers, messages, agent identiers, server identier, in-
truder identier, nonces, keys and constant messages. In 
, the operators
0; succ and + are meant to handle arithmetic operators in protocol specica-
tions. We use A(1); A(2); : : : ; A(n), B(1); B(2); : : : ; B(n) to denote agent
identiers. We use I(A(1)) to denote the intruder impersonating the agent
A(1). The value cte abstracts all constant messages. For example, simple
texts are considered as constant messages. The constant S is used to identify
an agent acting as a server. We use  to identify protocol sessions. Note
that  has an agent identier as a parameter since in the semantic model
we associate a distinct session to each principal playing a role. The second
parameter is used to distinguish dierent sessions of the same principal. We
use N as a constructor of fresh messages (nonces). The family of K construc-
tors is used to model cryptographic keys: K : Agt ! Key for public keys,
K
 1
: Agt! Key for private keys, K : AgtAgt! Key for shared keys and
K : Agt  Agt  Nat ! Key for dynamic keys. Finally, the operator f g
 
allows to encrypt a given message with a key and the operator  ;  allows
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the catenation of messages. For the sake of simplicity, we will use subscript
and superscript annotations to lighten the notation of messages in the follow-
ing way: The principal A(1) will be written A
1
, the nonce N(2; A(1)) will be
written N
2
a
1
, and the shared key K(A(1); B(1)) will be written K
a
1
b
1
. The
partial order stipulates that agents, keys, nonces, servers and constants are
considered as messages; i.e., Agt 
S
Msg, Key 
S
Msg, Nce 
S
Msg and
Cte 
S
Msg. The server is considered as a particular agent; i.e., Srv 
S
Agt.
4 Syntax and Security Semantics
In this section we present a role-oriented SPC syntax and describe its for-
mal game semantics. We describe the semantics of a protocol P by a cate-
gory G where objects represent roles behaviours, morphisms represent intruder
strategies and morphism composition captures interactions between intruder
strategies.
4.1 Syntax
In the SPC calculus, a cryptoprotocol is described by a set of roles. Each
role is composed of two parts: a declaration part and a communications part.
A role declaration is made of four parts: a principal identication part, a
session identication part, a knowledge declaration part and a communication
part. The principal identication part is introduced via the operator I which
declares the name of the principal playing the role. The term I A
x
introduces
the principal A
x
. The session identication part is introduced by the use of
the construct S and serves to declare a session. The declaration part is similar
to the declaration part of SPC except that in SPC there is no need to specify
the principal in the construct K. Thus, the term K m stipulates that the
message m is initially known by the principal declared through the operator
I. The communication part is made of a sequence of communication steps. A
communication step may be an input or an output. An input communication
is specied by a term of the form A
x
?m that denotes the reception of a message
m from the principal A
x
. An output communication is specied by a term of
the form A
x
!m that denotes the transmission of a message m to the principal
A
x
. The construct nil denotes the end of a communication sequence. The
syntax of SPC is dened by the BNF grammar given in Table 1.
For instance, we describe a version of the Woo and Lam authentication proto-
col in our calculus. Table 2 gives a description of this protocol in the standard
notation. Here A
x
and B
y
are principals and S is an authentication server.
N

k;B
y
b
y
is a nonce generated by B
y
at the session 
k;B
y
, K
a
x
s
is a key shared
between A
x
and S and K
b
y
s
is a key shared between B
y
and S. The goal of
this cryptographic protocol is to use the server S to authenticate the principal
A
x
with respect to the principal B
y
. The nonce is used by B
y
to guarantee the
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Table 1
The Syntax of SPC
hProtocoli ::= fhRolei; hProtocolig j fhRolei; hRoleig Protocol
hRolei ::= hIdihSessihDeclihComi Role
hIdi ::= I A
x
: Principal Identication
hSessi ::= S 
k;A
x
: Session Identication
hDecli ::= K m: hDecli j  Declaration
hComi ::= A
x
!m; hComi j A
x
?m; hComi j nil Communication
freshness of the exchanged messages. The specication of the Woo and Lam
cryptoprotocol in the SPC calculus is given in Table 3. We use the notation
A, B, C to denote role names and R
A
, R
B
, R
C
to denote the corresponding role
specications.
Table 2
The Woo and Lam Authentication Protocol
Message .1. A
x
 ! B
y
: A
x
Message .2. B
y
 ! A
x
: N

k;B
y
b
y
Message .3. A
x
 ! B
y
: fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
Message .4. B
y
 ! S : fA
x
; fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
g
K
b
y
s
Message .5. S  ! B
y
: fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
b
y
s
From now on, a protocol P is always viewed as a set of roles:
P =
S
NR
n2N
R
n
where, R denotes the set of role identiers and R
n
a role of P.
Along this document, given an alphabet M , we write M

to denote the free
monoid induced by M ; i.e., the set of nite sequences over M . We use s, t,
u, v to denote sequences and a, b, c to denote elements of these sequences.
Concatenation of sequences is indicated by the "." operator, and we do not
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Table 3
The SPC Specication of the Woo and Lam Cyptoprotocol
P
WL
(A;B;S) = fR
A
;R
B
;R
S
g
I A
x
:
S 
m;A
x
:
K K
a
x
s
:
B
y
!A
x
;
B
y
?N

k;B
y
b
;
B
y
!fN

k;B
y
b
g
K
a
x
s
;
nil
(a) R
A
I B
y
:
S 
k;B
y
:
K K
b
y
s
:
K N

k;B
y
b
y
:
A
x
?A
x
;
A
x
!N

k;B
y
b
y
;
A
x
?fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
;
S!fA
x
; fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
g
K
b
y
s
;
S?fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
b
y
s
;
nil
(b) R
B
I S:
S 
l;S
:
K K
a
x
s
:
K K
b
y
s
:
B
y
?fA
x
; fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
g
K
b
y
s
;
B
y
!fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
b
y
s
;
nil
(c) R
S
distinguish notationally between an element and the corresponding unit se-
quence. The empty sequence is noted by  and we have s: = :s = s for
each sequence s. We write jsj for the length of the nite sequence s and s
i
for the ith element of s, 1  i  jsj. Let M
1
, M
2
be two sets and s 2 M

1
be a sequence, we write s  M
2
for the sequence obtained by deleting from s
all the elements that are not in M
2
. We write s v t if s is a prex of t; i.e.,
t = s:u for some u. We use s v
even
t for a t subsequence of an even length.
Let s be a sequence and 1  i  jsj. We write s
v
i
for the prex sequence
of s up to the element s
i
included; i.e., s = s
v
i
:s
i+1
:s
i+2
: : : s
jsj
. Similarly,
we write s
@
i
for the prex sequence of s up to the element s
i
excluded; i.e.,
s = s
@
i
:s
i
:s
i+1
: : : s
jsj
. Let s be a sequence, we write respectively s
ev
and s
od
for the sub-sequence of s obtained by a projection on respectively even and
odd positions in s.
Denition 4.1 [Sequence Components] Let M be a set and s 2 M

be a
sequence. The components of the sequence s , noted s, is a subset of M
dened as follows:
(i) if s =  then s = ;
(ii) if s = a:s
0
then s = fag [ s
0
Let  = (a; b; c; d; e) be a 5-tuple where a, b, c d and e are of some type. We
use the notation Session(), Role(), Sender(), Receiver() and Message()
for the rst, second, third, fourth and fth component of . We use the same
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notation for sequences in the following way: let M be a set of 5-tuples and let
u 2M

be a sequence, we dene:
Session(u) = fSession() j  2 ug
Role(u) = fRole() j  2 ug
Sender(u) = fSender() j  2 ug
Receiver(u) = fReceiver() j  2 ug
Message(u) = fMessage() j  2 ug
4.2 Generalized Form
In this section, we introduce a transformation on roles called generalization.
This transformation takes an SPC role specication as input and produces a
generalized version of the role. Intuitively, the generalized version is produced
to make explicit the instrumentation possibilities of the role. For instance,
some messages are replaced by fresh typed variables to mean that the principal
playing the role can receive any message in place of the original specied one.
Moreover the generalized role is represented by a tree structure to take into
consideration partial executions of the role and/or dierent possibilities of role
instrumentations.
To make the semantic model introduced in the next section, simple and com-
pact, we suppose that the communication steps in each role begin by a send
action, alternate between send and receive actions and end by a receive action.
To implement this restriction we introduce a ctive action that manipulates
an empty message called Æ. This action is added in the role communication
sequences to make the restriction hold. For instance, if an SPC specication
begins by a receive action then we add before this action a send action that
manipulates the message Æ.
The actions manipulated by the generalized form are 5-tuples (a; b; c; d; e)
where, a serves to identify a particular execution (or session) of a role in a
cryptoprotocol P, b is a constant identifying the name of the role in P, c serves
to identify the sender agent, d serves to identify the receiver agent and e is
the message used in the communication step. We consider that the role is
executed between a regular agent and the smart intruder masquerading other
agents. Each send action transits from a regular agent playing the role to
the intruder and each receive action transits from the intruder to the regular
agent playing the role. The generalized form is viewed as a set of even-length
and prex-closed action sequences. The original role is then split into many
sub-roles, in fact a sub-role is attached to each input of the original role. This
is motivated by the fact that the intruder can instrument the role. Given a
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role R
A
, we write T
A
to denote the associated generalized role.
To illustrate the generalization process, consider the roles R
A
of the Woo and
Lam cryptoprotocol. For this role, the following steps are made:

The agent A
x
sends its identity to the agent B
y
. This action is repre-
sented by (
k;A
x
;R
A
; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
), where I(B
y
) represents the intruder
masquerading the agent B
y
.

The agent A
x
receives the messageN

k;B
y
b
y
. Since N

k;B
y
b
y
is locally unknown
to A
x
, the latter can accept any message instead. We replace the message
N

k;B
y
b
y
by a variable X and generate the action (
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X).

The agent A
x
reacts by sending the message fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
a
x
s
. Actually A
x
sends the message fXg
K
a
x
s
since he cannot verify the message N

k;B
y
b
y
.
Then, the generated action is (
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); fXg
K
a
x
s
).

The intruder ends the communication by sending the empty message Æ. We
represent this action by the tuple (
k;A
x
;R
A
; I(B
y
); A
x
; Æ).
In summary, the generalized form associated with the role A is as follows:
f ;
(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
):(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X);
(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
):(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X):
(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); fXg
K
a
x
s
):(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; Æ)
g
We can verify that the set above has a tree structure. From now on, let P be
a protocol, we note P
G
the set of generalized roles (trees) in P and P

G
the set
of sequences in P
G
.
Throughout the rest of this document, we assume that the network is under
the control of a malicious smart intruder. All messages sent or received by
honest principals, transit by the intruder. This is to capture the fact that the
intruder is aware of any message circulating over the network. Moreover, we
assume that the intruder is able to perform the following actions: overhear
messages, intercept messages, replay messages and generate new messages
using its initial knowledge and the overheard messages.
4.3 Security Semantics
To describe the semantics of the SPC calculus, we adopt a game semantics
model. The rationale underlying this choice is twofold: game semantics is
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a highly intentional semantics that captures the dynamics of computation
while abstracting from the syntax. Second, cryptoprotocols are mainly based
on interactions between principals. Interaction involves communication and
value passing. In this setting, game semantics is an ideal framework since
it puts the emphasis on interactions. It combines the elegant mathematical
structural properties of denotational semantics with the ability to capture the
intentional (or algorithmic) and dynamic aspects of the computation.
The notions introduced in this section while heavily inuenced by the work of
Abramsky et al. and Hyland et al. [4,5,24,25] are nonetheless new. The work
previously proposed are undoubtedly very successful and pioneering, however,
it is the rst time that game semantics is applied in the eld of security pro-
tocols. This is denitely an opportunity for very interesting and very useful
results. Game semantics constitutes an ideal model for the description of secu-
rity protocol behaviors. The latter are mainly based on interactions between
regular agents running a protocol and the intruder having a full control over
the network.
In the sequel, we introduce a mathematical structure called S-specication .
This structure will be useful to model a role specication.
4.3.1 S-specications
The main feature of S-specications is that they provide an explicit repre-
sentation of the intruder; this is a suitable model for specifying interactions
between regular agents running some roles and the smart intruder having a
full control over the network. We call a communication action, a 5-tuple of
the form (
k;p
; n; e; r;m) where:

 2 
. It is used to build session identiers.

k 2 X
Nat
.

n 2 R is the name of the role.

p; e; r 2 fA
x
; B
y
; S; I(A
x
); I(B
y
); I(S) j x; y 2 X
Nat
; A;B; S; I 2 
g are
used to identify principals.

m 2 T
Msg
(X) is a message.
We identify two types of communication actions: regular agent actions, noted
Reg and intruder actions, noted Int. More formally, let a be a communication
action, we dene a function type( ) that determines the type of an action in
the following way:
type(a) =
(
Int if Sender(a) = I( )
Reg else
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An S-specication is a structure S = (M
S
;;
S
; T
S
) where:

M
S
is a set of communication actions (alphabet).

;
S
: is a relation on M
S
+ f?g, called enabling, which satises:
 if ?;
S
a then b;
S
a implies b = ?
 if a;
S
? then a;
S
b implies b = ?
 if a;
S
b then type(a) 6= type(b)
 if ?;
S
a then type(a) = Reg
 if a;
S
? then type(a) = Int
Here ? is simply used as a dummy symbol to simplify the representation of
the relation ;
S
.
Intuitively, the relation; is used to capture the ordering on communication
actions imposed by cryptoprotocols. Let a 2 M
S
if ? ;
S
a then a is said
to be an opening action and if a;
S
? then a is said to be a closing action.
We use the notation a;
S
b to mean that a is immediately above b in the
ordering and a;

S
b to mean that a is hereditarily in relation with b.

T
S
is a non-empty even length prex-closed (noted ne-el- pref ), subset of
the set of nite alternating sequences in M
S
; i.e., T
S

ne el pref
M
alt
S
such
that if s 2 T
S
, a and b are actions and s
1
; s
2
; s
3
2M
alt
S
then:
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
(?;
S
a ^ a;

S
b ^ s = s
1
:a:s
2
) ) b 62 s
1
(a;
S
b ^ s = s
1
:a:s
2
) ^ even(js
1
j) ) s
2
= b:s
3
(a;

S
b ^ s = s
1
:b:s
2
) ) a 2 s
1
where:
M
alt
S
= fs 2M

S
j 8i 1  i  jsj : even(i)) type(s
i
) = Reg ^
odd(i)) type(s
i
) = Int
g
The set T
S
is systematically generated from the set M
S
subject to the con-
ditions given above. It represents the S-specication tree. Each specication
sequence s 2 T
S
alternates between regular agent actions and intruder actions.
It begins by a regular agent action and ends by an intruder action.
The simplest S-specication is probably the empty one I = (;; ;; fg). The
gure 4 gives a more complicated example, that is the S-specication trees of
the roles R
A
, R
B
and R
S
of the Woo and Lam authentication protocol.
39
Adi, Debbabi
Let S be an S-specication then each element (sequence) of T
S
is called
specication sequence.
Table 4
S-specication trees of the Woo and Lam Authentication Protocol
Æ

(
k;B
y
;B; B
y
; I(A
x
); Æ)
Æ
(
k;B
y
;B; I(A
x
); B
y
; X)

(
k;B
y
;B; B
y
; I(A
x
); N

k;B
y
b
y
)
Æ
(
k;B
y
;B; I(A
x
); B
y
; Y )

(
k;B
y
;B; B
y
; I(S); fX;Y g
K
b
y
s
)
Æ
(
k;B
y
;B; I(S); B
y
; fN

k;B
y
b
y
g
K
b
y
s
)
(a) T
B
Æ

(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
)
Æ
(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X)

(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); fXg
K
a
x
s
)
Æ
(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; Æ)
(b) T
A
Æ

(
k;S
;S; S; I(B
y
); Æ)
Æ
(
k;S
;S; I(B
y
); S; fA
x
; fXg
K
a
x
s
g
K
b
y
s
)

(
k;S
;S; S; I(B
y
); fXg
K
b
y
s
)
Æ
(
k;S
;S; S; I(B
y
); Æ)
(c) T
S
In what follows, we dene the notion of orthogonal S-specications. Roughly
speaking, given an S-specication S, the orthogonal S-specication, written
S
?
associated to S, inverses the direction of communication actions. Each
receive action becomes a send action and vice-versa.
Denition 4.2 [Orthogonal S-specication] Given an S-specication S, we
dene the orthogonal S-specication S
?
as follows:

M
S
? = fpaq j a 2M
S
g

;
S
? is a relation on M
S
? + f?g such that:
a;
S
b, paq;
S
? pbq

T
S
? 
ne el pref
M
alt
S
?
such that if s 2 T
S
?, a and b are actions and
s
1
; s
2
; u 2M
alt
S
?
then:
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
(?;
S
? a ^ a;

S
b ^ s = s
1
:a:s
2
) ) b 62 s
1
(a;
S
? b ^ s = s
1
:a:s
2
) ^ even(js
1
j) ) s
2
= b:s
3
(a;

S
?
b ^ s = s
1
:b:s
2
) ) a 2 s
1
The function p q that operates on actions is dened as follows:
8
<
:
p(
k;B
;R; I(A); B;m)q = (
k;A
;R
?
; A; I(B);m)
p(
k;A
;R; A; I(B);m)q = (
k;B
;R
?
; I(A); B;m)
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Finally, we x (R
?
)
?
= R. Notice that R
?
is just a syntactic notation to
identify role names.
It is easy to verify that (S
?
)
?
= S.
In the sequel, we dene a tensor product operator, noted 
, that operates
on S-specications. Intuitively, we can think of the 
 operator as a merge of
two S-specication trees in an interleaved way. First, we give a denition of
a disjoint union of actions sets. Given a family of action sets fX
i
g
i2I
, we use
the notation 
i2I
X
i
for their disjoint union and we write:

i2I
X
i
= fy
i
(a) j a 2 X
i
; i 2 Ig
that is canonical concrete representation where y
i
(a) is similar to a except for
variables that are indexed by i.
Denition 4.3 [Tensor Product] Given two S-specications S and S
0
, the
tensor product S 
 S
0
is the S-specication dened as follows:

M
S
S
0
= M
S
+ M
S
0
is the disjoint union of the two action sets.

a;
S
S
0
b, (a;
S
b _ a;
S
0
b)

T
S
S
0
is the set of all sequences s 2M
alt
S
S
0
such that the restriction to the
moves in M
S
(resp. M
S
0
) is in T
S
(resp. T
S
0
); i.e.:
8
<
:
s M
S
2 T
S
s M
S
0
2 T
S
0
Proposition 4.4 Let S 
 S
0
be an S-specication . If successive actions
s
i
; s
i+1
in a specication sequence s 2 T
S
S
0
are in dierent components;
i.e., one in S, the other in S
0
or vice versa, then s
i
is an intruder action
and s
i+1
is a regular agent action. In other words, only the regular agent can
switch from one S-specication component to another. The intruder must al-
ways respond in the same S-specication in which the regular agent just moved
in.
Denition 4.5 [Linear Maps] Given two S-specications S and S
0
, the linear
map S ( S
0
is the S-specication dened by:
S ( S
0
= S
?

 S
0
In this S-specication, the orthogonal S
?
of S is played in parallel with S
0
.
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A linear map S ( S
0
imposes a contravariance on the component S, in which
the roles of the regular agent and the intruder are interchanged. Intuitively,
as illustrated in gure 1, if the intruder plays in S ( S
0
, then:

The component S is used as input: This is done by instrumenting some roles
in S, i.e., supplying (input) roles by messages in order to get new messages.

The component S
0
is used as output: The intruder will answer (output) all
the challenges uttered by a specic role in order to build an attack against
this role.
Fig. 1. Intruder Behavior on S ( S
0
S
?
S
0
Role attack
Intruder
Role instrumentation
- -
Notice that in S ( S
0
the play always starts in S
0
since each play in S
?
starts
with an intruder action. The switching property in S ( S
0
is dual to that of
S 
 S
0
in the sense that only the intruder can switch from one component to
another.
Proposition 4.6 Let S ( S
0
be an S-specication . If successive actions
s
i
; s
i+1
in a specication sequence s 2 T
S(S
0
are in dierent components;
i.e., one in S, the other in S
0
or vice versa, then s
i
is a regular agent action
and s
i+1
is an intruder action. In other words, only the intruder can switch
from one component to another. The regular agent must always respond in
the same component that the intruder just moved in.
From now on, to lighten the notation, we write u  S instead of u M
S
, with
S be an S-specication and u be a specication sequence.
4.3.2 Intruder Strategies
In the sequel, we dene the notion of intruder strategies over S-specications
and composition of intruder strategies. Intuitively, an intruder strategy spec-
ies how the latter can combine parts of roles in order to build an instrumen-
tation of the protocol, i.e. supply roles by messages in order to get potentially
new messages. This instrumentation will allow the intruder to answer all
the challenges uttered by a specic role and then build an attack against the
principal running this role.
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Denition 4.7 [Intruder Strategy] Let S be an S-specication. A strategy
 for S is a non-empty prex- closed subset of T
S
(a sub-tree), and we note
 
ne pref
T
S
. We say that  has the type S and we write S ` .
Hereafter, we dene a particular strategy for the intruder called "forward
strategy". This strategy allows the intruder to make passive attacks by simply
intercepting and forwarding messages without any alteration of them. This
kind of attacks is generally used by intruders to analyze the traÆc.
Denition 4.8 [Intruder Forward Strategy] Let S be an S-specication, we
denote by id
S
the forward strategy dened as follows:
id
S
= fu 2 T
S
?

S
j 8t v
even
u : (t  S)
?
= t  S
?
g
For instance, the intruder forward strategy associated with the S-specication
of the role A of the Woo and Lam cryptoprotocol is presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Forward Intruder Strategy for the S-specication of the Role A
A
?
A
Æ

(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
)
Æ
(
k;B
y
;A
?
; I(A
x
); B
y
; A
x
)

(
k;B
y
;A
?
; B
y
; I(A
x
); X)
Æ
(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X)

(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); fXg
K
a
x
s
)
Æ
(
k;B
y
;A
?
; I(A
x
); B
y
; fXg
K
a
z
s
)

(
k;B
y
;A
?
; B
y
; I(A
x
); Æ)
Æ
(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; Æ)
In the sequel, we dene the composition of two intruder strategies. Given
strategies S
?

 S
0
`  and S
0?

 S
00
` 
0
, we would like to compose them
to form the strategy S
?

 S
00
` 
0
Æ . Intuitively, the composition uses
interactions between two strategies in order to build a new intruder strategy.
The composition is allowed only if the projection of  in S
0
and the projection
of 
0
in S
0?
are forward strategies. The interaction between the strategies 
and 
0
is then done via the components S
0
and S
0?
.
Given strategies S
?

 S
0
`  and S
0?

 S
00
` 
0
, we dene the parallel compo-
sition k
0
of  and 
0
as follows:
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k
0
= fu 2 (M
S
? +M
S
0
+M
S
0? +M
S
00
)
alt
j u  S
?
; S
0
2  ^
u  S
0?
; S
00
2 
0
^
u  S
0
; S
0?
2 id
S
0
g
So, k
0
consists of a set of sequences generated by playing the strategies
 and 
0
in parallel selecting possibilities that are compliant with a forward
communication between S
0
and S
0?
.
Denition 4.9 [Composition of Strategies] Given two strategies  over the
S-specication S
?

 S
0
and 
0
over the S-specication S
0?

 S
00
. We dene
the composition 
0
Æ  as follows:

0
Æ  = fu  S
?
; S
00
j u 2 k
0
g
For instance, we give in Figure 2 a representative play in two composable
strategies.
Fig. 2. Composition of Intruder Strategies
A
?
B B
?
C( (


0
c
1
b
1
b
2
b
3
b
k
a
1
b
2
b
3
b
k
b
1
b
k+1
a
2
c
2
b
k+1
In the sequel, we show that the composition is well-dened and associative.
Proposition 4.10 Composition of strategies is well-dened, that is, if  is a
strategy for S
?
1

 S
2
and 
0
is a strategy for S
?
2

 S
3
then 
0
Æ  is a strategy
for S
?
1

 S
3
.
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Proposition 4.11 Composition is associative, that is, if S
?
1

 S
2
` , S
?
2


S
3
` 
0
, S
?
3

 S
4
` 
00
are intruder strategies then:
(
00
Æ 
0
) Æ  = 
00
Æ (
0
Æ )
In the following, we prove that the intruder forward strategy is an identity for
composition.
Lemma 4.12 Let S
?
1

 S
2
` , we have:
id
S
1
Æ  =  =  Æ id
S
2
Denition 4.13 [The Category] We dene the category G of S-specications
and strategies as follows:

Objects are S-specications.

Morphisms s : S
1
! S
2
are strategies on S
1
( S
2

Composition is interaction between strategies:
s : S
1
! S
2
s
0
: S
2
! S
3
s
0
Æ s : S
1
! S
3

Identities are intruder forward strategies.
Theorem 4.14 G is a category.
5 Abstract Semantics
In this section, we present the notion of an abstract domain of messages for
cryptographic protocols and dene an abstract interpretation for SPC's game
semantics. The new abstract semantics is used to approximate the possible set
of intruder knowledge to a nite one when it runs a cryptoprotocol P. This
information is then used to decide if the cryptoprotocol satisfy the secrecy
property on a sensitive message.
5.1 Abstract Domain of Messages
Given the message algebra T


(X) for the signature  = ((S;
S
);
), we
dene an abstract message algebra T
A(
)
as the term algebra for the signature
 = ((S;
S
);
 [ 

a
) where:


a
=
8
<
:
> : ! Msg
? : ! Msg
The abstract representation of messages uses the abstract values > and ?.
Intuitively, the value > is used to abstract a (possibly innite) set of messages.
For instance, the message f>g
K
stands for any message encrypted with the
key K. It is an abstraction of a (possibly innite) set of concrete messages
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encrypted with the key K. We use also the abstract message value ? to
represent the empty set of messages.
We dene an ordering relation on abstract messages 
a
that captures the
notion of approximation on messages 8m 2 T
A(
)
:
8
<
:
? 
a
m
m 
a
>
Given a nite set of messages M , we dene an abstract nite closure of M
noted M
#
+
. The closure operation captures the usual intruder capabilities:
encryption, decryption, messages catenation and message decomposition. In
general, this operation leads to an innite set of messages. The abstraction
process gives us a way to obtain an abstract nite representation.
We dene two mappings up
;
c
( ) and up
;
e
( ) to approximate messages. These
mappings take a message m and replace some sub-messages of m by the ab-
stract value >. Intuitively, up
;
c
( ) and up
;
e
( ) allow to prune the algebraic
structure of a message while keeping the external form of that message. The
mappings up
;
c
( ) and up
;
e
( ) take as parameters two limits l
1
and l
2
that are
natural numbers. Intuitively, the value l
1
acts on the depth of encryptions in
a message while the value l
2
acts on the depth of catenations in a message.
Given two limits l
1
and l
2
then up
l
1
;l
2
c
( ) and up
l
1
;l
2
e
( ) are dened as follows:

up
l
1
;l
2
c
(m) = m if m is atomic and l
2
> 0

up
l
1
;l
2
c
(m;m
0
) = up
l
1
;l
2
 1
c
(m); up
l
1
;l
2
 1
c
(m
0
)

up
l
1
;l
2
c
(fmg
K
) = up
l
1
;l
2
e
(fmg
K
)

up
l
1
;0
c
(m) = >

up
l
1
;l
2
e
(fmg
K
) = fup
l
1
 1;l
2
e
(m)g
K

up
l
1
;l
2
e
(m;m
0
) = up
l
1
;l
2
c
(m;m
0
)

up
0;l
2
e
(fmg
K
) = >

up
l
1
;l
2
c
(>) = >

up
l
1
;l
2
e
(>) = >

up
l
1
;l
2
c
(?) = ?

up
l
1
;l
2
e
(?) = ?
Given a message m and limits l
1
and l
2
, we dene the mapping:
a
: T
A(
)
 ! T
A(
)
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m
a
=
(
up
l
1
;l
2
e
(m) if m = fm
0
g
K
up
l
1
;l
2
c
(m) else
For instance, let x be the message fm
1
; fm
2
;m
3
g
K
1
; ffm
4
g
K
2
;m
5
g
K
3
;m
6
g
K
4
,
l
1
= 2 and l
2
= 4, then:
x
a
= fm
1
; f>g
K
1
; f>;m
5
g
K
3
;m
6
g
K
4
The abstract closure operation M
#
+
is dened as the smallest set satisfying:

If m 2M then m
a
2M
#
+

If K 2M
#
+
and fmg
K
2M
#
+
then m 2M
#
+

If (m;m
0
) 2M
#
+
and m 6= > then m 2M
#
+

If (m;m
0
) 2M
#
+
and m
0
6= > then m
0
2M
#
+

If m 2M
#
+
and K 2M
#
+
then (fmg
K
)
a
2M
#
+

If m 2M
#
+
and m
0
2M
#
+
then (m;m
0
)
a
2M
#
+
5.2 Abstract Intruder Knowledge
In this section, we give a way to compute the nite abstract set of all possible
intruder knowledge when it plays a particular strategy. More formally, given
an intruder strategy  and the set of intruder initial knowledge K
I
, then the
intruder knowledge associated with , noted IK(), is as follows:
IK() =
s2
[
s js M
M
where the relation js is dened in Table 6. The substitution introduced
in Table 6 operates only on the variables introduced by the generalization
process. For instance, consider the intruder strategy of the protocol of Woo
and Lam:
 = (
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); A
x
):(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; X):
(
k;A
x
;A; A
x
; I(B
y
); fXg
K
a
x
s
):(
k;A
x
;A; I(B
y
); A
x
; Æ)
Let the initial intruder knowledge K
I
= ;, the depth of encryption l
1
= 2 and
the depth of catenation l
2
= 2, then, the abstract set of intruder knowledge
associated with  is:
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M = f A
x
; A
x
:A
x
;>:A
x
; fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
; fA
x
:A
x
g
K
a
x
s
; f>:A
x
g
K
a
x
s
; A
x
:fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
;
A
x
:f>g
K
a
x
s
;>:fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
;>:f>g
K
a
x
s
; fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
:f>g
K
a
x
s
; fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
:A
x
;
fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
:>; f>g
K
a
x
s
:Ax; f>g
K
a
x
s
:>; f>g
K
a
x
s
:fA
x
g
K
a
x
s
g
We extend the intruder knowledge function IK( ) to S-specications. Let A
be an S-specication then:
IK(A) =
[
A`
IK()
Table 6
Abstract Intruder Knowledge Generation from Specication Sequences
Init
2
 js K
I
#
+
Get knowledge
s jsM Message((s)) M V ar((a)) = ;
s:a:b js (M [Message((a)))
#
+
where
 is a close substitution on message variables
V ar( ) computes the set of message variables
K
I
is a nite set of intruder initial knowledge
5.3 Abstraction Endofunctor
The main objective of the abstraction enfofunctor  : G ! G is to restrict the
innite category G to a nite one. We denoted by G
a
the image of G by .
First, we dene an ordering relation on the objects of the category G.
Let A = (M
A
;;
A
; P
A
) and B = (M
B
;;
B
; P
B
) be G-objects, then:
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A v B , P
A

ne pref
P
B
Denition 5.1 [Abstraction Endofunctor] The abstraction endofunctor  =
(
0
; 
1
) is dened as follows:

0
: Obj(G)  ! Obj(G)
A 7 ! MinfX 2 Obj(G) j X v A ^ IK(X) = IK(A)g

1
: hom
G
 ! hom
G
 : A! B 7 ! Minf
0
: 
0
(A)! 
0
(B) j 
0

pref
 ^ IK(
0
) = IK()g
where Min computes the smallest element in an ordered chain.
In the sequel, we characterize a sub-category of G, called G
P
, corresponding
to a particular cryptoprotocol P.
Denition 5.2 [Sub-Category G
P
] Let G be the semantics category and P be
a cryptoprotocol. We dene the sub-category G
P
of G as follows:

The empty object I is in Obj(G
P
).

For each role R
n
in P, there exists an object S in G
P
such that T
S
= T
n
.

For all G
P
-objects S and S
0
, G
P
(S; S
0
) = G(S; S
0
)

Composition and identity morphisms in G
P
are the same as in G
Given a cryptoprotocol P and its semantic model G
P
, we denote by G
P
a
its
abstract semantic model. The following proposition states that the abstract
semantic model for a cryptoprotocol P is nite, i.e. has a nite number of
objects and a nite number of morphisms.
Proposition 5.3 (Finiteness) Given a cryptoprotocol P, then the abstract
category G
P
a
is nite.
The following proposition proves the soundness of our abstraction, that is, if
a message m is kept secret in the abstract model then it is also kept secret in
the concrete model.
Proposition 5.4 (Soundness) Let P be a cryptoprotocol, G
P
be the associ-
ated concrete model, G
P
a
the associated abstract model, M the set of messages
that can be known by the intruder when it runs P and N the abstract knowledge
of the intruder then:
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M
a
 N
where:
M
a
= fm
a
j m 2Mg
And
N = fm 2 IK() j  2 hom(A;B) ^ A;B 2 Obj(G
P
a
)g
5.4 Secrecy
Secrecy is the fact of keeping secret a given piece of information. This aspect
of security is certainly the oldest and the best known. We say that a protocol
preserves the secrecy of one of its parameters if it does not leak any information
about these parameters during its execution. The parameters of the protocol
that have to be kept secret are generally cryptographic keys or any other
sensitive data. For instance, the following protocol does not guarantee the
secrecy of the message m since the key used to encrypt m has been made
public.
:1 A ! B : K
ab
:2 B ! A : fmg
K
ab
Given a cryptoprotocol P and a sensitive messagem, we say that P guarantees
the secrecy of m if:
8A;B 2 Obj(G
P
a
);8 2 hom(A;B) : 8x 2 IK() : x um
a
= ?
6 Conclusion
We have reported in this paper the denition of an abstract space of messages
for cryptographic protocols and an abstract interpretation for SPC's game
semantics, a dedicated calculus for security protocols. The way to achieve this
goal is to restrict the categorical concrete semantics to a nite abstract one
according to some abstraction of the intruder knowledge. Since the abstract
category is nite, it becomes possible to compute the nite abstract set M
#
of messages that the intruder can get by running a cryptoprotocol P. Given
a message m, if for all x in M
#
, glb(x;m
a
) = x um
a
= ? then m is distinct
from all messages in M
#
and consequently P does not leak the message m.
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